Abstract: Despite the relevance of geographical disparities in India, earnings inequality occurs mostly within states, but with a broad range of variability in their levels. We investigate the sources of such variability using -decompositions of the inequality gaps between most populous states and India. Our results point at substantial compositional effects associated with the cross-state variability in the extent of high-skilled formal employment outside the farm and construction sectors, along the degree of urbanization and some demographic factors. Cross-state differences in conditional earnings structures, however, turned out to be crucial, especially regarding the different degree of earnings stratification by caste in each state.
Introduction
Income inequality levels in India are higher than OECD average levels, but (like in China) still lower than in other emerging countries such as Brazil or South Africa (Arnal and Forster, 2010) . Despite the declining trend in poverty, inequality has increased over time (Chauhan et al., 2016) , partly because of the growth of the tertiary sector, with a high duality between very small-sized and very large firms (Mazunder, 2010) . This shift in employment might have contributed to increasing earnings inequality because most of industry and service jobs pay more than agricultural casual labor even after accounting for levels of education and other individual characteristics (Rama et al., 2015) . The importance of demographic factors, especially caste and religion, to determine earnings inequality in India is also a well-known fact (e.g. Bhaumik and Chakrabarty, 2006) , while different research has highlighted the importance of geographical disparities. Growing inequality was associated with the increase observed in urban areas, raising a concern about the accentuation of regional imbalances, with the benefits of growth concentrated in the already richer states, leaving the poorest and most populous states further behind (Arnal and Forster, 2010) . High growth rates in richer states have led to a boom in commercial and service sector activities, while in most of the poorest states agriculture is still predominant. Regional disparities in poverty increased in the 1990s, with the southern and western regions doing much better than the northern and eastern regions (Deaton and Dreze, 2002) . Between-district inequality was shown to be a substantial proportion of total inequality, to a large extent explained by between-state income differences in rural India (Azam and Bhat, 2016) . Within-state inequalities, however, still explain most of the overall level of inequality and its trend. Economic inequality increased within states, especially within urban areas, and between urban and rural areas, and tend to be higher in developed regions (Deaton and Dreze, 2002; Chauhan et al., 2016) .
In this context, the aim of the paper is precisely to identify the main sources of the variability in within-state earnings inequality in India. The methodology is based on the use of the Recentered Influence Function ( ) of different inequality measures. Using regressions of these functions on worker characteristics, we first estimate the marginal contribution of each characteristic on a given inequality index in India and in a selection of the most populous states. Then, we measure the expected change in inequality when either the distribution of characteristics or the earnings structure of the whole country replaces that of the state. This exercise also serves to illustrate with the case of India the potential and limitations of the use of this regression-based decomposition technique to regional inequality analysis. This technique has been previously used to decompose interdistributional differences in quantiles and, to a lower extent, in the Gini index. We explore here its use in the analysis of other inequality indices such as the Generalized Entropy and Atkinson families to investigate how the sources of inequality vary depending on the degree of inequality aversion.
In what follows, Sections 2 and 3 present the methodology and data. Section four discusses inequality in Indian states. Sections five and six discuss the results of the corresponding regressions and decompositions. The concluding section summarizes the results.
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Methodology: Decomposing the gap in inequality using the Recentered Influence Function
The aim of this section is to show how to obtain a decomposition of the gap in earnings inequality between each target state and the entire country, taken as the reference distribution. One element of the decomposition is the part explained by differences in characteristics (compositional effect). The remaining unexplained part is the differential that is driven by diverging earnings structures (earnings effect). For that, we use the generalization of the Blinder (1973 )-Oaxaca (1973 approach proposed by Lemieux (2007, 2009) . 1 The simplest version of this method applies the conventional Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to the of the target statistic between two distributions, using a regression of individual values of that function on workers' characteristics. The is just a measure of the influence of each particular earnings on the target statistic (i.e. an inequality index in our case). Noteworthy, the ( ; ) is a non-monotonic transformation of earnings , in which extremely high/low values will have a disproportionally large influence in the inequality index , with an intensity that depends on the particular sensitivity of that index to values at each part of the distribution. This is discussed in detailed in Appendix 2. The conventional Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is the special case in which the statistic is the mean of (log-) earnings.
The approach has been extensively used so far for the decomposition of the interdistributional gap in earnings (or income) quantiles, but has also a large potential in decomposing the difference between inequality indices. We are aware only of decompositions applied to the Gini index though (e.g. Becchetti, Massari, and Naticchioni, 2014; Ferreira, Firpo, and Messina, 2014; Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 2007; Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo, 2011b; Gradín, 2016; Groisman, 2014) , none of them in regional analysis.
Let us assume that the conditional expectation of ( ; ) is a linear function of the explanatory variables, given by matrix , such that the -coefficients can be estimated by OLS:
Then, by the law of iterative expectations:
Each coefficient reflects the marginal impact on the index of a small change in the average value of the corresponding characteristic. This takes into account the distributional pattern of what levels of earnings are affected most by the change in the characteristic.
Based on (2) it is possible to decompose the inequality index linearly into the total contribution of each characteristic (including the intercept) , = 0,1, . . . , , on inequality:
The total contribution of the th characteristic is the product of its average value ( ̅ ) and the marginal impact of this characteristic on overall inequality ( ). Thus, from (3), the differential in inequality between the reference and target distributions (with superscripts 0 and 1) can be expressed as the sum of the total contributions of characteristics ( ∆ , = 0, … , ): However, we usually want to break the total contribution into the impact of differences in average characteristics and that of differences in coefficients. One way to do that is by constructing a counterfactual that combines the average characteristics of one distribution with the coefficients of another. We can have at least two alternative counterfactuals with different interpretations.
Let us consider the case in which we combine the Indian conditional earnings structure (coefficients) and each state average characteristics, with inequality given by 10 = ̅ 1 0 . This can me interpreted as either giving Indian conditional earnings structure to the target state, while keeping its own characteristics or, equivalently, giving India the average characteristics in the state, while keeping its own coefficients.
Alternatively, we can consider combining Indian characteristics and state coefficients instead: 01 = ̅ 0 1 . This can be viewed as giving the average Indian characteristics to the target state, while keeping its own coefficients or, equivalently, giving India the conditional earnings structure in the state.
By adding and subtracting the inequality level in the counterfactual and re-arranging terms, we can rewrite the inter-distributional differential in earnings inequality as the sum of the explained and unexplained effects: 
The aggregate explained effect captures the impact of India and the state having different average characteristics. For that reason, it is also called the characteristics or compositional effect. It is valued using the Indian conditional earnings structure in (5), ∆ , 0 = ( ̅ 1 − ̅ 0 ) 0 , and each state earnings structure in (6), ∆ , 1 = ( ̅ 1 − ̅ 0 ) 1 . One advantage of (5) is that the characteristics effect is evaluated using a common earnings structure for all states, unlike the characteristics effect in (6). The latter has the attractive interpretation of estimating inequality if the state had the same characteristics as in India. But it also implies that cross-state variation, our main focus of interest, may be due to either differences in characteristics or differences in coefficients used to evaluate it. For this reason, our main reference will be the decomposition in (5).
The aggregate unexplained effect reflects the impact of Indian and the sate having different conditional earnings structures, and is valued using the state average characteristics in (5), ∆ , ̅ 1 = ̅ 1 ( 1 − 0 ), and Indian characteristics in (6), ∆ , ̅ 0 = ̅ 0 ( 1 − 0 ).
Thanks to the linearity of the approach, the individual contribution of each variable to the characteristics and coefficients effects can be measured as
) and ∆ , ̅ = ̅ ( 1 − 0 ), = 0,1, so that the individual effects sum up the corresponding aggregate effects. The sum of the characteristics and coefficients effects of each characteristic also add up to the total contribution of that same characteristic.
As Gradín (2016) discussed, there have been other regression-based decompositions of inequality measures in the literature. For example, some approaches have assumed linear conditional (log-) earnings and proposed a decomposition of the total effect of characteristics on inequality using different decomposition rules (associated with different inequality indices). In this line, Fields (2003) used the 'natural' decomposition of the variance of logs, which would apply to other indices of inequality following the results of Shorrocks (1982) . Similarly, Morduch and Sicular (2002) also used the 'natural' decomposition rules of other inequality measures, such as the Gini index, to produce similar decompositions. In an alternative approach, Wan (2002) and Wan and Zhou (2005) applied the Shapley decomposition (Shorrocks, 2007) . These approaches, however, have not separated the characteristics and coefficients effects. This is done in Yun (2006) , following Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) , extending the Fields ' (2003) approach in the case of the variance of logs, an index of inequality that does not entirely verify the most important property (that a small progressive transfer reduces inequality). In this context, the decomposition is quite general, valid for all most popular inequality measures (for which the exists). Given the linearity assumption, it is path-independent, it is straightforward to compute (including the standard errors), and invariant to the level of aggregation of explanatory factors. Furthermore, it can be seen as a generalization of the conventional Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, which is the particular case in which the target statistic is the mean.
The approach, shares with most counterfactual analyses some limitations, though. According to Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011a) , aggregate decompositions need to assume the invariance of the conditional earnings distribution, which requires two main conditions. One is the simple counterfactual treatment, which implies that there are no general equilibrium effects. The second one is ignorability, meaning that there is no selection of individuals based on their unobservables. Detailed decompositions usually require stronger assumptions, such as linearity in the relationship between (of log-earnings) and characteristics, or exogeneity of individual characteristics.
Another important limitation of this and other decompositions is the identification problem of the detailed coefficients effect (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999) . The detailed coefficients effect is not invariant to which dummies are omitted to include categorical variables, and to what normalization is used for continuous variables. Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011a) pointed out that there is no general solution to this problem and those proposed in the literature (such as Gardeazabal and Ugidos, 2004 or Yun, 2005 , 2008 are all ad-hoc. For that reason, we will devote most of the analysis to the detailed characteristics effect, and just highlight the most salient detailed coefficients effects.
The sample is made of 52,937 (unweighted) observations of workers reporting positive hourly earnings (take-home wage and bonuses, cash or in-kind) and the relevant characteristics. The main analysis is done comparing India with a selection of 11 of the most populous states with a significant number of observations to undertake a sound regression analysis: Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu. These states make up 77% of Indian workers and represent the least developed areas. Only Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra have average earnings above the country level.
We consider several worker characteristics that might influence her earnings and thus inequality. We included area of residence (urban or rural) because inequality increased mostly in urban areas and between urban and rural areas. Given also the potential importance of demographic factors, we consider gender, age (24 or less, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55 and above) , marital status (married or not), caste (Brahmin, Forward/General castes -except Brahminor other, Other Backward Castes -OBC-, Scheduled Castes -SC-, and Scheduled Tribes -ST), and religion (a dummy to identify the Muslim minority). The main determinants of earnings are attained education (8 categories, from none to some post-graduate), as well as several labor market outcomes such as primary activity status and sector (cultivation, agriculture wage labor, construction wage labor, other non-agriculture wage labor, salaried worker, other), type of work (regular/permanent/longer contract, as opposed to casual jobs), and a dummy for managerial or professional occupations.
Inequality across Indian states
Geographical inequalities in India are important, but still most earnings inequality occurs within states according to the decomposition of several inequality indices shown in Table 1 . This amounts to 86-87% of total inequality with GE(0) and GE(1). These are the only two additively decomposable indices whose weights for aggregating the within-group component add up to one (weights are respectively population and earnings shares). The Atkinson family, whose equality indices (the complementary to inequality) are multiplicatively decomposable, also shows much higher inequality within states than between states, regardless of the level of inequality aversion. Earnings inequality in India exhibits a high variability across states and union territories (Table 2) . For example, the Gini index ranges between only 0.306 in Bihar to 0.545 in Mizoram. Among the selected most populous states, it still varies between 0.331 in Andhra Pradesh or 0.337 in Madhya Pradesh at the bottom, and 0.441 in Maharashtra or 0.443 in Gujarat at the top. A first glimpse at this variability suggests that it might be related to some prevailing characteristics of workers in each state. In this line, Figure 1 shows the positive and statistically significant association between the Gini index and average earnings across states ( 2 is 0.37). States with relatively higher average earnings also tend to be those with higher education or larger degree of urbanization, among other things. However, the small number of states does not give us enough degrees of freedom to undertake a complete regression analysis considering all factors at the same time. The approach used here, however, permits identifying the role of several factors associated with some states having higher or lower inequality in the selected states, considering the particularities of each state. Source: Own construction using IHDS-II. The heterogeneity in the composition of the workforce across Indian states is also large. The objective of the next sections is to understand the extent to which these differences in characteristics explain the variation in level of earnings inequality across states, or alternatively they result from different conditional earnings distributions instead. For that, we need to first understand how each worker characteristic helps to shape earnings inequality in India.
Factors associated with earnings inequality in India: -Regressions
In a first stage we estimate the values of each inequality index, as shown in Appendix 2. Richest percentiles, and to a lower extent also the poorest, contribute disproportionally to each corresponding inequality index (see Table 4 ). The contribution of top earnings to inequality declines with inequality aversion in the case of the Atkinson family (implying higher sensitivity to inequality in earnings among the poorest). It increases with the GE parameter, but goes out of proportion with extreme values. For that reason, we will analyze Gini and the Atkinson family. Source: Own construction using IHDS-II.
In the second stage, we estimate the regressions ( of each inequality index conditional on worker characteristics), reported for India in Table 5 . The estimated coefficients show the effect that a marginal change in the proportion of each characteristic has on the corresponding inequality measure. They help us to understand the net effect of several characteristics on inequality ceteris paribus, in a reduced form without uncovering the actual transmission mechanisms. They thus identify the higher/lower prevalence of which characteristics are more strongly associated with earnings inequality. As a result of the previous discussion, those characteristics with higher prevalence at the extremes of the earnings distribution, but especially at the top, will have a stronger association with inequality.
Earnings inequality measured by the Gini index is significantly associated in India with the location of workers and with some demographic factors such as gender, age or caste, but more strongly with education and labor characteristics. We can see that earnings inequality in India, indeed, increases with the proportion of workers living in urban areas, given that growing inequality was an urban matter as consistently pointed out by the literature. This remains even after controlling for worker education or the share of agrarian labor workers among other things. Inequality also increases with the proportion of female, older (aged 45 or more) and married workers, while declines with the proportion of those aged between 24 and 34 years old (compared with youngest workers). India is a society strongly stratified by caste, especially regarding the occupational distribution, and thus this is also a factor associated with earnings inequality. Inequality tends to decline with higher proportions of non-Brahmin castes, and thus to increase with Brahmin and ST, respectively the most advantaged and disadvantaged groups. A much larger increase in inequality goes along the proportion of workers with higher attained education (especially with college degree or higher). Inequality tends to increase with the proportion of high-skilled jobs (managers/professionals) and regular/permanent workers or with those out of the farm and construction sectors.
The regressions for the Atkinson family of inequality indices confirm most of the above, but also reveal a clear distributional pattern. Although most associated effects tend be higher with higher inequality aversion (implying higher sensitivity to the poorest), they are smaller as a percentage of the corresponding inequality index, especially in the cases of highest education and managers and professionals, indicating that these characteristics are less relevant when inequality is more sensitive to the bottom of the distribution. There are some exceptions, though. The proportion of workers with primary or secondary education completed, receiving a salary or a wage (out of agriculture and construction sectors) tend to increase inequality in a greater extent with higher inequality aversion. Similarly, a higher proportion of Muslims only increases inequality for highest inequality aversion.
These regressions are also run separately for each target state (Table A2 in the Appendix). The main factors associated with earnings inequality in India can be found in most states, although with some relevant exceptions. For example, an increase in urbanization does not significantly increase inequality in highly urbanized states such as Gujarat and Karnataka (and Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, except for high inequality aversion), but also in the much less urbanized Uttar Pradesh. Similarly, the proportion of women has no significant effect in two states with relatively more female workers (Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh -except for highest inequality aversion in the former). However, other states with large female participation (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Rajasthan) show important and significant gender effects. In the same line, the proportion of regular workers has no significant effect in the state with the largest prevalence of this type (Maharashtra, where it is associated with lower inequality for low inequality aversion).
There is also great cross-state variation in the effects associated with various characteristics. For example, the coefficient for college education (0.208 for India) ranges from being statistically non-significant in Andhra Pradesh, to be as large as 0.456 in Orissa, two states with relatively few college graduates. On the other side, the coefficient for managers and professionals is much larger in the state with the lowest prevalence of skilled workers, Andhra Pradesh (the coefficient is 0.635, compared with 0.307 in India). The most striking differences, however, can be found in the contribution of the caste distribution, a sign that earnings stratification by caste diverges greatly across states. While the worker caste distribution seems to have no significant effect in some states (West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra) and only a moderate effect in others (Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Gujarat), the effect is much larger in a few states characterized by having a small proportion of very affluent Brahmin and other forward castes.
2 In these states, a higher proportion of forward castes substantially increases inequality. This is the case of Chhattisgarh, which also stands out for the largest proportion of ST, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, with large proportions of SC and OBC, and Karnataka, with a distribution more similar to the average of the country. 
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Decomposing the earnings inequality gaps between selected states and India
Most selected states have lower inequality than the country as a whole, with Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh standing out with the largest gaps ( Figure 2 ). Gini inequality in these two states is 24% and 22% lower than in India. In intermediate levels, inequality is about 7-11% lower in Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, and Chhattisgarh. These are followed by Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal with smaller gaps (3% or lower). Only in Maharashtra and Gujarat the Gini index is around 2% higher than in India. Using the information from the previous regressions, Tables A3-10 in the Appendix report the -decomposition of the earnings inequality gap between each state and India using the two alternative counterfactuals.
Figure 2. Inequality gaps between India and a selection of states (Gini)
Source: Own construction using IHDS-II. States ranked from lowest to largest Gini.
The compositional or characteristics effect evaluated using the Indian coefficients (first counterfactual, as in (5)) explains a substantial proportion of the Gini gap (about 60-70%) between a few states (Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Rajasthan, and West Bengal) and India. The proportion is smaller in relative terms, 31% and 23%, in the two states with the largest gaps (Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh), where most of the differential remains unexplained. The gap that is explained is also proportionally smaller in Orissa (43%) and Chhattisgarh (13%). The entire inequality gap remains unexplained in Tamil Nadu, where the explained component is negative, indicating that the gap would be larger if the state had the Indian earnings structure (or India had the same characteristics of the state). Regarding the two states with inequality higher than India (negative gap), the differential is fully explained by the compositional effect in Maharashtra, but remains unexplained in Gujarat.
These results for the aggregate decomposition are summarized in Figure 3 , with the gaps expressed as percentage of the Indian Gini index to facilitate the comparison across states. The compositional effects account for a gap that is equivalent to 7% of the total Indian Gini in Andhra Pradesh, 6% in Uttar Pradesh, and 5% in Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Karnataka, and only 2% in Rajasthan and West Bengal.
According to the detailed decomposition of the explained effect (summarized in Figure 4 ), labor variables are the most important: about 5% of the Indian Gini in Andhra Pradesh, 4% in Orissa and Karnataka, and about 3% in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. For example, the much lower proportion of regular/permanent workers explains near 4% of the Indian Gini in Karnataka, and around 2% in Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. The lower proportion of managers and professionals explains an additional 2% in Andhra Pradesh, and around 1.5% in Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. Lower attained education accounts for another 3% in Madhya Pradesh, and between 1-2% in Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Chhattisgarh, and West Bengal.
The distribution of the population by caste additionally helps to explain the lower level of inequality in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh (between 1.4-2.1% of the Indian Gini) due to a larger overrepresentation of OBC and SC at the expense of Brahmin and other forward castes, as well as ST. The impact of the lower degree of urbanization amounts for 1% of the Indian Gini in Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Differences among other demographic variables are relevant in Uttar Pradesh (associated with 1.5% lower inequality altogether) because of its higher proportion of younger, male and unmarried workers.
The value of some average characteristics prevailing in a few low-inequality states, on the other hand, are associated with higher inequality, thus preventing the gap to be even larger. It is the case of the caste distribution (with a higher presence of ST and lower of SC and forward castes) in Chhattisgarh (2.8%), Madhya Pradesh and Orissa (about 1.5%), or some demographic factors in Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh (higher proportion of women, 1.2% and 1.5% respectively) or in Tamil Nadu (older age of workers, 1.7%).
Regarding the detailed unexplained components (valued using the average characteristics of each state), the largest effects are those associated with caste, especially in Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu, states in which we have identified the strongest relationship between caste and inequality. That is, it seems that although the caste distribution only explains a small proportion of the variability in Gini across states, the different degree of earnings stratification by caste in each state (conditional on other characteristics) plays a much more fundamental role.
With the alternative counterfactual used in (6), the compositional effect now reflects the expected impact of equalizing each state characteristics with those of India, keeping its own conditional earnings structure. However, the fact that the composition effect is evaluated with local conditional earnings structure means that differences across states may come from two sources, from differences in the average characteristics, like before, but also from how they are differently evaluated in each state.
The results shown in Tables A7-10 in the Appendix indicate that the proportion of the gap that is explained by characteristics in the alternative counterfactual is generally larger. It is for example, 43% and 53% in the states with the largest gaps, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, i.e. 10% or more of the Indian Gini. It is even higher in relative terms in Orissa and Uttar Pradesh (66% and 85% of the gap), while the entire gap is explained in Karnataka, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, or West Bengal. There are less differences in the two states with inequality above the Indian level. This larger explanatory power of the compositional effect comes from generally larger contributions of the labor variables when they are evaluated using the local conditional earnings structures in all states. But they also come from a larger contribution of the caste composition in some states with different case stratification (like Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Chhattisgarh), from the different degree of urbanization in others (Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra), and from sex and/or age composition in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. Noteworthy, the role of attained education tends to be substantially larger only in a few cases (West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, or Karnataka), but smaller in Andhra Pradesh. Finally, we the analysis of the Atkinson family of inequality indices reveals whether or not three is a distributive pattern. The relative gaps explained by characteristics tend to be higher than with Gini in some states, but declining with the level of inequality aversion (e.g. from 37% of the Indian value to 32% in Andhra Pradesh, from 31 to 28% in Madhya Pradesh, from 13% to 10% in Uttar Pradesh, from 12% to 3% in Karnataka, from 9% to 3% in Tamil Nadu). This implies that characteristics become less important as we give more weight to inequality among the poor in these states. On the contrary the compositional effect is increasing in other states (from 14% to 24% in Orissa, from 0% to 15% in Chhattisgarh, from 5% to 10% in Rajasthan, or from -3% to 5% in West Bengal).
The role of the different characteristics using the Atkinson family is similar to the one they played using the Gini index, although their values vary according to the importance of the total gap. Labor variables explain around 8-9% of Indian inequality in Andhra Pradesh, 7% in Orissa and Karnataka, around 4-5% in Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. As one could expect, the role of regular or managers and professional workers in shaping inequality tends to be weaker for higher inequality aversion. This is also generally true for other characteristics like caste or gender, but not for urban areas or education, that show less variability.
Concluding remarks
India is a large and heterogenous country with undeniable socioeconomic disparities across regions. Earnings inequality in India as well as its growing trend takes place mostly within states, however. Nevertheless, inequality levels significantly vary across states, along their potential explanatory factors such as the degree of urbanization, economic development, labor force participation, or caste composition, among other things.
In this paper, we first used regressions of Gini and Atkinson inequality indices to identify what characteristics are more strongly associated with earnings inequality in India, because of their higher prevalence at the extremes of the earnings distribution, ceteris paribus. Then, we used the estimated coefficients to provide decompositions of the inequality gaps between most populous/least developed states and the entire country to understand why some states have lower (or higher) inequality. For that, we used a counterfactual in which either the coefficients or the average characteristics of one distribution were swap with those of the other.
With this approach, we have shown that these inequality gaps are strongly associated with the composition of the workforce in each state. More specifically, we have shown that lower inequality in some states can be explained because they are lagging behind others in the expansion of regular high skilled wage or salaried labor outside the farm and construction sectors. Differences in the degree of urbanization also matter in some cases, ceteris paribus, along the composition of the workforce by some demographic factors such as gender, age or caste. This relevance of the shift in employment outside the farm sector is line with the predictions of the Lewis model and Kuznets´ inverted-U hypothesis of how inequality changes during earliest stages of economic development in dual economies.
We have also shown that the importance of the compositional effect depends on the degree of inequality aversion or sensitivity to inequality among the poorest workers, but not in a systematic way. It declines in some states but increases in others, and some characteristics, such the proportion of high-skilled regular workers but also caste or gender decline with inequality aversion. Furthermore, our results show that the relevance of the compositional effect tend to be larger when they are evaluated using local conditional earnings structures. Indeed, cross-state variability in conditional earnings structures, especially the degree of caste stratification, emerges as one fundamental factor to associated with the geographical variability in inequality levels. Source: Own construction using IHDS-II. Omitted categories: metropolitan area, male, unmarried, 24 years old or younger, Brahmin, non-muslim, none education, work type: cultivation, non-regular worker, non-managerial/professional occupation. data contamination in high incomes (in some cases also to low incomes). Flachaire (2002, 2007) compared the rate of increase to infinity of the influence function of different inequality indices when goes to infinity, which is equal to in the cases of Gini, Atkinson and Generalized Entropy ( ≤ 1), and equal to for the Generalized Entropy ( > 1). When goes to 0, Generalized Entropy ( < 0) tends to infinity at the rate , and the Atkinson (0 < < 1) at 1− , and Generalized Entropy ( = 0) and Atkinson ( = 1) at the rate ln .
Appendix 1: Complementary tables
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Let us illustrate this with our data. For example, the total contribution of the bottom and top earnings deciles to the national Gini index are 15% and 29% respectively (reported in Table 4 ). In the case of Atkinson, the extremes contribute more: the bottom 20%, 21%, and 23% (for = .5, 1, 2), the top 42%, 41% and 34%. As expected, the contribution of the bottom (top) increases (decreases) with the inequality aversion parameter. The general entropy case is different. 5 The contribution of the bottom generally increases with (from -8% with = −2 to 23% with = 0, to then decline again: 19% with = 1). The contribution of the top decile, conversely, declines: from 73% ( = −2) to 41% ( = 1). In the case of = 2 the figures go out of proportion, the contribution is negative until the 87 th percentile, and becomes huge in the last three percentiles. This disproportionally large effect of very few observations with high earnings entirely compromises its use in empirical exercises of the type proposed here, especially if we suspect we might have measurement errors at the top of the earnings distribution.
The cases of Gini, GE ( = 0,1), and Atkinson ( = .5, 1, 2) thus show a similar profile, even if with different intensities. The cases of GE ( = −2, −1,2), however, show very different profiles. 4 As Cowell and Victoria-Fesser (1996) pointed out, this sensitivity of inequality indices to extreme values has not to be confused with where in the earnings distribution the impact of a progressive transfer produces the largest increase. For example, in the case of the Gini index, it is around the mode of the distribution. 5 It is well-known that Entropy and Atkinson families are ordinally equivalent if = 1 − for > 0, where is the Source: Own construction using IHDS-II.
